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Considérées mathématiquement, les infinitésimales de Leibniz étaient des fictions, des entités 
qui ont emprunté leur réalité à l'inexhaustabilité nécessaire de la division du continu. Reste 
que pour Leibniz toutes les entités géométriques ou mathématiques étaient dans tous les cas 
inactuelles, des produits de l'imagination. Cependant, dans son projet de dynamique, Leibniz 
a formulé une distinction entre les causes réelles et les effets imaginaires ou géométriques qui 
constituent les phénomènes de mouvement. En outre, il a donné, de cette cause réelle, une 
interprétation quantitative, mv
2
, produit de la masse et de la vitesse qui sont tous deux des 
quantités de nature extensive. Mais par crainte de confusion entre le réel et l'imaginaire, un 
nombre d'interprètes ont jugé problématique que l'écart du modèle mathématique leibnizien 
du mouvement soit comblé par la force et la nature quantitative qui lui est attribuée. Dans ce 
qui suit, je soutiens que la compréhension de la force comme cause du mouvement nous 
oblige non seulement à tenir compte du rôle irréductible joué par les quantités mathématiques 
dans la nature causale de la force, mais aussi que les mathématiques déployées pour déplier 
ce rôle causal de la force consistent précisément dans la méthode du calcul infinitésimal.  En 
tant que telles, bien que les quantités infinitésimales soient des fictions, elles jouent un rôle 
dans le rapport actuel entre la causalité fondamentale et systématique du mouvement et son 





Leibniz’s Specimen Dynamicum presents a basic interpretive challenge. Given that 
this text was a synthetic sample of his dynamics project, what it prominently features is an 
alternative to a purely “imaginary” that is, merely geometrical or mathematical approach to 
corporeal motion, by posing force as the systematic foundation or cause governing the 
phenomenon of motion. Yet despite the meta- or infra- phenomenal status of force as the 
substantial and inherent reality of bodies, this very notion of force, understood as cause, plays 
a direct role in Leibniz’s alternative mathematical account of the laws of motion starting with 
the estimation of vis viva as mv
2
. The problem is most telling when Leibniz uses infinitesimal 
quantities in his account and measure of dead forces. Given the fictional status of 
infinitesimals, we encounter not only a description of force in geometrical terms but also in 
fictional geometrical terms. The Specimen Dynamicum not only requires us to understand 
how forces are to be conceived through the quantities that they engender in physical laws but 
also how the use of infinitesimals is part and parcel to this conception.   
 In what follows I argue for the necessity of these fictional infinitesimal quantities in 
Leibniz’s account by demonstrating what it means to understand force as cause. First I briefly 
take up the seeming illegitimacy of using fictional infinitesimal quantities to describe the 
actuality of force. With the help of prominent commentators, we see that infinitesimal 
quantities are not any more problematic than other standard quantities in an account of 
corporeal motion through force. The reason is that if we isolate force as a foundation of 
corporeal motion with a metaphysical reality unto itself then any quantitative account would 
be heuristically adequate but ultimately insufficient. Secondly, given that Leibniz’s own 
conception of force is immediately correlated with the quantity mv
2
 as its measure, I argue 
that we cannot fully evade quantities by reductively separating the metaphysics of force from 
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its purported mathematical measure. By showing the inadequacy of Leibniz’s own 
measurement of force I argue that what remains is nonetheless a positive and irreducible 
quantitative aspect in his conception of force. Thirdly, I argue that although we might not 
attach a particular quantity to this measure of force, Leibniz does provide sufficient means, 
through the architectonic principles of the equipollence of entire effect and full cause and the 
equivalence of hypotheses, to understand the quantitative nature of force qua cause. This 
requires us to understand that the causal nature of force is not only efficient but also 
teleological. It is this teleological dimension that allows us to grasp why forces are 
irreducibly quantitative in its organization of phenomena. In turn, I argue, through the 
Leibnizian critique of the “disorder” or incoherency of the quantities involved in the 
Cartesian account of motion, that to understand the causal nature of force is precisely to 
understand the ordering of the quantities in phenomena. Finally, I argue that the use of 
infinitesimals is part and parcel of this very ordering of quantities, a consequence, through the 
principle of continuity, of force qua cause. Infinitesimals then, despite being fictional and 
imaginary, are nonetheless an essential feature of what it means for force to be causal. Hence 
I conclude that although geometrical and mathematical quantities, including fictional 
infinitesimals, are imaginary, they are nonetheless at work in the reality of the causal 
engendering of phenomena, an actual bridge between causes and effects. 
 
II. The imaginary quality of fictional quantities 
  
Leibniz, in the publication of the first part of the Specimen Dynamicum in the April 
1695 issue of the Acta Eruditorum, adds a clause that was not in the original manuscript. 
Immediately after having described the nisus or solicitation of vis mortua (dead force) as 
infinite parvum, Leibniz adds the caveat that: “quanquam non ideo velim haec Entia 
Mathematica reapse sic reperiri in natura, sed tantum ad accuratas aestimationes abstractione 
animi faciendas prodesse.”1 This apologetic addition may have been aimed at assuaging his 
contemporaries but its tardy entrance into the text draws our curiosity. Indeed such a 
statement, regardless of its explicit and straight-forward manner, does nothing more than to 
state that dead forces are not actually infinitely small magnitudes but does not give any clue 
to how or why these fictional quantities are nonetheless useful in making “accuratas 
aestimationes”. Of course Leibniz's apologetic qualification of the fictional status of 
infinitesimal magnitudes is not any different from what he says frequently and unequivocally 
elsewhere. As early as 1676, Leibniz had already used the notion of infinitesimals as 
“quantitates fictitiae” in a clear way.2 Years later in the early 1700's Leibniz would respond to 
debates raging in the French Royal Academy concerning the infinitesimal calculus again by 
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designating infinitesimals as “ideals and well-founded fictions”.3 
 Although infinitesimal quantities can be understood as fictional, this characterization 
does not do much to clarify their role in the Specimen. We see throughout the Specimen and 
in other dynamical writings that Leibniz engages deeply in the structure of his infinitesimal 
calculus to provide an account of the different aspects of force, their relations to motion and 
the relations between the quantities involved in motion in the Specimen. Leibniz's correlation 
of dead force with an infinitesimal magnitude is part of a systematic use of the infinitesimal 
calculus to describe extended motion. With regard to the nature of motion, Leibniz 
unequivocally states that,  
“Porro ut aestimatio motus per temporis tractum fit ex inanitis impetibus, ita vicissim impetus 
ipse (etsi res momentanea) fit ex infinitis gradibus successive eidem mobili impressis, 
habetque elementum quoddam, quo non nisi infinities replicato nasci potest.”4  
Leibniz had previously defined motus or extended motion as “change of place” and 
“instantaneous element of motion” as motio.5 Impetus had also been defined as the 
momentary quantity of motion or the product of velocity and mass. Impetus is then mv, what 
the Cartesians called “quantity of motion”.6 Leibniz explains that the quantity of a motion, 
understood as extended corporeal motion, is made up of the “sum over time” of infinite slices 
of momentaneous impetus, which are, in turn, the product of momentaneous velocity and 
mass.
7
 Leibniz further says that the impetus themselves are the result of an infinite number of 
impressions or solicitations (nisus). In modern terms, we might say that the impetus is the 
momentaneous “quantity of motion” and that the nisus, impressions or solicitations, are 
higher-order differentials that integrate into impetuses.
8
 This use of higher-ordered 
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 In François Duchesneau’s treatment of these passages in the Specimen, echoing Martial Gueroult’s treatment of 
the same passages in Dynamique et Metaphysique Leibniziennes, he ventures to give a mathematical formulation 
of conatus, nisus and their resulting role in dead and living force. Duchesneau argues,  
Une transposition symbolique possible nous donnerait pour le conatus (compte tenu qu’il s’agit d’une quantité 
vectorielle):  
Conatus = dv = gdt  
Pour l’impetus réduit à la quantité de mouvement dans l’instant (=quantité de motion), par contraste avec m|v| 
pour Descartes:  




pour l’impetus dans son effet temporal:  











pour la force vive:  
vis viva=𝑚∫ 𝑔𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝑚∫ 𝑣𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0




Although the formalization here, especially the last line on “living force”, makes little mathematical sense, it is 
one of the possible ways of understanding of Leibniz’s explicit development in these passages of the Specimen. 
It is one possibility of rendering the degrees involved in integrating dead forces into the quantity of living 
forces. Duchesneau and Gueroult do make explicit both the mathematical intentions of Leibniz and the 
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differentials demonstrates a deep rather than superficial commitment to the methods of the 
infinitesimal calculus in this account since it is not only the question of arbitrarily defined 
heuristic metaphors for infinitely small quantities that are at stake here. Rather Leibniz is 
clear that the very structure put in place to account for these different orders of magnitudes in 
motion is none other than that of his infinitesimal calculus developed years before.  
 In view of Leibniz's warning that infinitesimal quantities do not exist in nature, we 
could safely say that Leibniz limits his use of the infinitesimal calculus in his dynamics to an 
imaginary setting. We can understand Leibniz’s use of imagination here through what Leibniz 
says in the Specimen when he remarks on the insufficiency of approaching corporeal motion 
by taking bodies as mere extended things, that is, in the abstraction of geometrical or 
mathematical features, “pure mathematica et imaginationi subjecta”.9 In fact this imaginary 
status of the infinitesimals is an essential feature of the Specimen. The Specimen constitutes 
one of the final and most synthetic texts in a project of articulating a dynamics, a “Nova 
Scientia Dynamica” as Leibniz called it, based on force, which roughly occupied Leibniz 
from around 1678 to the late 1690’s.10 The project commenced in the mid-1670’s as a critique 
of Cartesian mechanism and evolved through successive stages of Leibniz’s development of 
the notion of force as the cause of motion. The foundational status of force and the naming of 
dynamics as special science was first publically announced in De primae philosophiae 
emendatione et de notione substantiae published in 1694, a year before the Specimen but 
such a formulation was already expressed in a letter to Bodenhausen in 1689.
11
 The central 
idea guiding this development was the conviction, against the Cartesians, that mere attention 
to the extended or geometrical features of motion is insufficient to provide a coherent theory 
of corporeal motion including laws of collision and conservation principles. Following an 
ideal of scientific knowledge of quasi-Aristotelian inspiration, Leibniz held that to know 
motion is to know its cause. The identification of the cause of motion as force then not only 
constituted a new science but also brought Leibniz to render force a centerpiece of his 
conception of substance in the 1680’s and 1690’s. In De primae philosophiae emendatione 
and other texts of the 1690's Leibniz is insistent on rendering vis viva (living force) and vis 
mortua (dead force) the two sides (form and matter) of a hylomorphic notion of substance.
12
 
As such, the dynamics project was one that was staked on the premise that a proper account 
of motion depends on an extra-geometrical register that is nonetheless capable of providing 
the grounds for its geometrical or extended features. This extra-geometrical or metaphysical 
register thus mediates the application of imaginary geometrical terms to the geometrical 
features of motion since the latter is itself only an imaginary thing. As such we should go a 
bit further here in noting that what are imaginary are not only the infinitesimal terms but any 
use of mathematics and geometry. Thus it seems that Leibniz is far from any danger of 
confounding the use of fictional infinitesimals with their hypostatization as real entities or, as 
he puts it, entities found in nature.  
 Although Leibniz's declarations concerning the fictional nature of infinitesimals here 
and elsewhere are unequivocal, we nonetheless face a major interpretive problem. It seems 
that what allows Leibniz to safely apply mathematics to phenomena is the imaginary status of 
both of these domains. Yet, it seems that the purely imaginary interpretation of Leibniz’s use 
of mathematics in the dynamics would render this use inadequate. On the one hand, the use of 
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mathematics in analyzing the imaginary, that is, extended features of motion does not 
overstep the bounds of Leibniz’s fictional use of infinitesimal quantities. We use something 
imaginary to describe another imaginary thing. On the other hand, this separation profoundly 
draws the account of motion away from its cause, force, for which seemingly only a 
metaphysical account can be given. Hence if the mathematical account of corporeal motion in 
the Specimen and elsewhere in the dynamics project must remain on the extensional level of 
imagination, separated from the causal level of force, then it seems that Leibniz has not 
exactly fared better than the Cartesians against whom the project was first conceived. Even if 
Leibniz could provide a more robust foundation of physics, the account of motion would still 
remain essentially imaginary, that is, geometrical and extended. At the same time if we 
attempt to treat forces, and not merely motion, through the infinitesimal mathematical terms 
provided in the Specimen, we seem to face the problem of granting infinitesimal magnitudes, 
the measure of dead force, for example, a real and actual status. This was what Leibniz was 
careful to explicitly deny. 
 A number of commentators have recently responded to this interpretive problem. D. 
Garber has argued that Leibniz uses mathematics to represent forces, but in this we should 
not mistake this representation as actualizing the quantities, especially infinitesimal ones, 
involved.
13
 Garber argues that mathematical terms “represent” dynamical terms but does not 
offer much in the way of understanding why and how this representation is adequate to 
provide the link between force qua cause and the extended features of motion qua effect. F. 
Duchesneau, a thorough interpreter of Leibniz’s dynamics who has a number of articles and a 
book-length treatment on the subject, offers an epistemological reading by arguing that the 
mathematical aspects of the Specimen constitute the elements of an analysis of motion (as 
opposed to a synthesis) which does not fully attain the completed science of a dynamics.
14
 
Duchesneau’s position is that a completed (synthetic) science of the dynamics is one that 
would dispense with these quantities except heuristically and operate synthetically through 
essential or formal terms.
15
 The use of quantities, infinitesimal and otherwise, are thus the 
elements for the modelization of motion which remain fictional precisely in the sense that 
they are useful for the analysis of phenomenon but can be dispensed with once the analysis is 
completed.  
 My argument here is roughly in agreement with Duchesneau’s general interpretation 
but aims at critically extending this view to provide an account of the crucial role that 
infinitesimals play in how these quantitative terms would lead to a completed science of the 
dynamics. That is, we must see the role of infinitesimals not only instrumentally in the 
analysis of motion but how these very quantities are irreducible in understanding force as the 
cause of motion in Leibniz's dynamics project. 
 The danger of not clarifying this role of infinitesimals in bridging force and motion is 
to slip into a reductively imaginary interpretation of the role of infinitesimals. This very 
danger is reflected in D. Rutherford’s recent commentary. Rutherford explicitly shares our 
interpretive problem stated above. He points out that Leibniz’s argument commits us to the 
position that momentary forces (ie. dead force), like the infinitesimals that describe them, are 
mere fictions. “[I]f force is real, it cannot be an infinitesimal quantity; if it is an infinitesimal 
quantity, it cannot be real.”16 As such, Rutherford argues, we must reject the possibility of any 
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adequate representation of force through mathematical means and limit the use of 
mathematics in the dynamics only to the various configurations of extended motion. Force is 
then an essentially metaphysical notion, something that Leibniz describes as “praeter pure 
mathematica et imaginationi subjecta, collegi quaedam metaphysica solaque mente 
perceptibilia esse admittenda” in the Specimen.17 Here, Rutherford adds, the “momentary” 
feature ascribed to dead forces soliciting movement does not last “for” a moment or any finite 
or infinitesimal amount of time but rather “at” a moment. As such, the fact that forces 
constitute the cause of motions does not mean that it constitutes the “principle” of such 
motions. Given the constraints that constitute the dynamics project, that is, the critique of 
Cartesian mechanism and the separation of a causal level of force from an imaginary level of 
motions, Rutherford's interpretation attempts to strike a balance between the metaphysical 
and scientific desiderata of the Specimen. In this reading even an epistemologically 
instrumental interpretation of infinitesimal quantities is misleading. If Leibniz is to be 
consistent, Rutherford argues, the mathematical terms ascribed to forces must be treated as 
heuristic in the loosest sense since forces can only be coherently taken as constituting the 
metaphysical and “internal” changes of a substance and not correlated in any strict way to the 
nature of motion itself.
18
  
Rutherford's sequestering of the status of forces to a metaphysical level is overly 
reductive. We agree that Leibniz's development of the notion of force in the Specimen and 
elsewhere possess a deeply metaphysical character that must not be ignored. Indeed, in the 
Specimen Leibniz uses the distinction between primitive and derivative forces to underline 
the per se or metaphysical nature of corporeal substance, understood as constant action 
(primitive), against their situated motions in the phenomena limited by their collision with 
other bodies (derivative). The measurable sort of force could only be the derivative sort since 
primitive force understood as the constant and immanent action of corporeal substances is 
non-phenomenal and escape measurement. Yet the Specimen remains a text aimed at 
employing force to explicate motion in a way that would refute and replace competing 
Cartesian, Occasionalist and (Cambridge) Platonist theories. As such, Leibniz clearly states 
the inadequacy of providing merely a theory of primitive force as “ad generales causas 
pertinet, quae phaenomenis explicandis sufficere non possunt.”19 The metaphysical import of 
Leibniz’s dynamics should be asserted but not at the cost of reducing forces to its exclusively 
metaphysical status. Rather it is precisely through forces understood as both primitive and 
derivative that Leibniz articulated the importance of providing a coherent foundation for a 
science of dynamics.  
The foundational task of the dynamics was developed throughout the late 1670’s up to 
the 1690’s, the two decades leading up to the Specimen. Part and parcel of this evolution, 
with metaphysical as well as scientific implications, was Leibniz’s guiding notion, already 
active in his initial critiques of Descartes in the 1678 De Corporum Concursu, of a direct 
association of force with a quantity, what he would eventually call the conservation of vis 
viva or force as mv
2
. This conservation, to be clear, is what Leibniz calls the measurement or 
estimation of force.
20
 This is something that Leibniz adopts from his Dutch-Parisian mentor 
Christiaan Huygens's theory of elastic collision and a major aspect of his entry into a full-
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fledged critique of Cartesian mechanism.
21
 The identification of force with a quantity mv
2
 is, 
in short, Leibniz’s path from a mere critique of mechanics into the dynamics qua special 
science. 
The over-emphasis of the metaphysical characterization of force is dangerous because 
it obliges us to give up too much of what Leibniz attempted to do in the Specimen. The role 
of force in bridging a metaphysical and phenomenal level in the account of force qua cause 
and motion qua effect should be emphasized rather than set aside in favor of a metaphysical 
reduction. The reason why commentators like Rutherford find this reductive solution 
attractive is because it is difficult to see how Leibniz could use mathematical terms in the 
account except in an imaginary manner. In this view since we do not want to treat forces as 
imaginary, we must reject its correlation with (imaginary) mathematical terms. To overturn 
this reduction of mathematics to a pure imaginary status, we must see how Leibniz’s 
conservation of force through the quantity mv
2
 cannot be reduced to the metaphysical realm. 
By examining Leibniz’s use of quantity in the dynamics, we find that, together with Leibniz’s 
larger metaphysical concerns, the use of mathematics plays an irreducible role in the account 
of forces without thereby dissolving the actuality of force into mere imagination.   
 
III. Complications in the measure and conservation of vis viva 
 
 A comprehensive account of Leibniz’s use of mv2 is too complex to enter into here 
and we shall focus only on its role in the Specimen. Yet to slightly contextualize this quantity, 
we simply note that Leibniz had as early as 1669 noted the controversy over conservation 
principles of motion occurring through the British Royal Society’s Philosophical 
Transactions in 1668 wherein John Wallis, Christopher Wren and Christiaan Huygens 




 Leibniz’s serious 
engagement with the notion of mv
2
 as the quantity conserved in motion is an explicit aspect 
of his 1678 De Corporum Concursu. From 1678 onward, Leibniz would return again and 
again to this quantity and it is no surprise that we find it explicitly in the Specimen as a 
“measure of force”.23 
 What is surprising is that the guiding role played by the quantity mv
2
 in the evolution 
of Leibniz’s dynamics ends up being presented in the Specimen in a different way. His uses of 
mv
2
 in many of the texts leading up to the Specimen are associated with the laws of collision, 
close to the original Huygenian context. Located in the posthumously published second part 
of the Specimen, not only does the explicit discussion of the laws of collision proceed without 
the explicit use of mv
2
 but, in the first part, the quantity becomes attached to another example, 
that of the motion of a pendulum. In earlier dynamical works such as De Corporum 
Concursu, echoing the works of Edme Mariotte whom he explicitly mentions in the 
Specimen, Leibniz makes use of pendulum examples but as a case of collision between two 
pendulums at the base of descent.
24
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The case in the Specimen is different in that it attempts to measure force through the 
unconstrained motion of the pendulum. This association of mv
2
 with the unconstrained 
motion of the pendulum reveals an important aspect of Leibniz's argument in the Specimen. 
In taking a closer look, we examine the difficulties in establishing the conservation of vis viva 
through the quantity mv
2
.    
 In the passage that immediately follows his announcement for obtaining a “measure of 
force”, Leibniz appeals to a series of examples involving pendulums. The first and simplest 
case considers two pendulums, side by side, of equal mass, A and C. Referencing Galileo's 
law of falling bodies, Leibniz reasons that the pendulum A with a speed of 1 unit ascends to a 
height of 1 foot. In turn the pendulum C with the speed of 2 units ascends to the height of 4 
feet. This means that a pendulum with 2 units of speed has four times as much power, as 
Leibniz calls it, or work in modern mechanical terms, than a pendulum of the same mass 
moving at 1 unit of speed. Conversely this also means that the speed attained by the second 





Leibniz draws the conclusion from this demonstration that, “Eodemque modo 
generaliter colligitur, vires aequalium corporum esse ut quadrata celeritatum, et proinde vires 
corporum in universum esse in ratione composita ex corporum simplice et celeritatum 
duplicata.”27 The veracity of mv2, as opposed to 1/2mv2, for the conservation of energy is not 
our concern here. Indeed, Leibniz does not need to make explicit the gravitational constant or 
the factor of ½ since he constructs a suitably simple comparative case between the two bodies 
A and C (of equal mass). All that needs to be demonstrated is that the quadratic increase of 
speed (acceleration) drawn from his use of Galileo’s law of falling bodies means that the 
height (four times) attained by body C directly reflects the principle that the linear difference 
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of speed between the two masses is proportional to the quadratic difference of height and 
hence power [virtus]. Yet despite providing an adequate measure for the quantities in this sort 
of example, it has not attained the status of a conservation principle for vis viva. I follow 
Carolyn Iltis here is maintaining that although Leibniz has achieved a measurement for the 
conservation of potential and kinetic energy, it is far from clear that he has established a 
conservation for vis viva or its universal measure.
 28
    
Leibniz’s argument here, brilliant as it is, does not provide such a conservation. Iltis’ 
critical remarks on the earlier works like Brevis Demonstratio Erroris Memorabilis Cartesii 
et Aliorum Circa Legem Naturae and §17 of Discours de métaphysique, are equally 
applicable to the Specimen. The point is that although Leibniz has given a measurement of 
some quantity conserved in nature, namely energy-work, this measure is not generalizable to 
other cases and a demonstration of this generalization has not been provided here. In this 
example above, the conservation of vis viva is presumed rather than demonstrated. Iltis 
further remarks that in the eventual history of the conservation of energy, scientists like 
Mayer, Joule and Helmholtz were also similarly beholden to a “metaphysical certainty” of the 
general conservation of energy guiding their empirical work.
29
 Duchesneau has argued 
against Iltis in remarking that there can be no empirical principle adequate to providing such 
a demonstration of the conservation principle.  With respect to the conservation of vis viva, 
there are only, for Duchesneau, “regulative theoretical principles for the interpretation of 
facts.”30 As such, for Duchesneau, Iltis sets up an impossible criterion in criticizing Leibniz. 
In reading these interpretations synthetically, we can observe that what Duchsneau and Iltis 
agree on is that insofar there can be no empirical demonstration for a generalized 
conservation of vis viva without first supposing it, what this pendulum example demonstrates 
is still at a certain distance from a measure of vis viva as such. In this, Leibniz’s concept of 
force should then not be strictly identified with the conservation of mv
2
 but rather the very 
idea of some quantity conserved in the nature of motion.
 31
 We have further reason then not to 
separate the “metaphysics” of force from its “empirical” measurement in a radical separation 
of a non-quantitative primitive force from its quantitative or extended counterpart, derivative 




We will examine some aspects of the underlying methodology of measure in this 
example a little later. What is crucial for now is to show that these complications in 
establishing a measure of vis viva allow us to make clear the real stakes of his arguments 
here. Before entering into a more direct discussion of this, we should first see the immediate 
aims of this conservation principle. In the passages that immediately follow the simple 
pendulum example discussed above, Leibniz provides a more complex and critical analysis.  
Leibniz moves from his simple pendulum case to critique what he takes to be the main 
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flaw, among others, of Cartesian mechanism, the alleged conservation of the “quantity of 
motion” mv or impetus. Here Leibniz modifies his initial pendulum example to one that more 
resembles, but does not coincide, with his argument, mentioned above, in De Corporum 
Concursu.
32
 This time, body A will be 2 units in size and C will be 1 unit in size. Their 
maximum speeds at the base of descent remains the same as the previous, A will be traveling 
at 1 unit of speed and B will be traveling at 2 units. Now according to his construal of the 
Cartesian laws of motion, the “quantity of motion” (mv) conserved in both bodies will be the 
same. The quantity in A will be 2(=2·1) and the quantity in C is also 2(=1·2). In this case, 
Leibniz can show, drawing from the fact that the Galilean principle of the rate of fall is 
independent of mass, that since the speeds of the two pendulums are the same as the earlier 
example, they would behave in the same way. The body A would ascend to the height of 1 
foot and C would ascend 4 feet. The quantities of work in this example will be different from 
the earlier example but assuming that the Cartesian “quantity of motion” mv was conserved, 
we could substitute one body for the other at the base of the descent of A and the start of the 
ascent of C since the “quantity of motion” between the two bodies would be identical at this 
state. Here Leibniz points to the absurdity that the “quantity of motion” conserved in body A 
would be capable of raising body C to a height of 4 feet. Not only is this empirically 
inadequate but Leibniz argues that this would result in a perpetual motion machine, an a 
priori demonstration of absurdity.
33
 This is, in Leibniz's terms, an ad absurdum argument 
against the idea that the quantity conserved in motion is indeed mv.  
Although saddled with some of the similar problems in the previous example, this 
case shows more clearly the stakes involved. Its explicit taking aim at the Cartesians is 
obvious but in this Leibniz also reveals how he sought to put a theory of motion on the right 
footing. The conservation of mv is demonstrated as false since it leads to an absurdity but this 
demonstration does not sufficiently render the conservation of vis viva in alternative quantity 
mv
2
. We see that the argument only requires the hypothesis that some quantity is conserved in 
motion and with this it follows from the demonstration that the quantity conserved is not mv. 
Reading this back to the earlier example, we see that Leibniz can assert that some quantity is 
conserved in the motion of the pendulum between its height of ascent and its speed at the 
base of the descent. Yet without already positing such a quantity at the outset such a quantity 
conserved cannot be demonstrated except through unwarranted generalization. Yet Leibniz 
nonetheless provides evidence that some quantity is conserved in motion and that this 
quantity is not mv. This is not only a judicious critique of the Cartesians but more importantly 
shows the hypothetical status of Leibniz’s use of mv2 as the quantity conserved in this case of 
the motion of the pendulum.  
What we can draw from this analysis is that Leibniz's notion of force has a 
quantitative aspect and cannot be reduced to its metaphysical status. Indeed, Leibniz is 
committed to the idea that it is through the superiority of this quantitative measure that allows 
us, at least in part, to deem force the “cause” of motion. Earlier, we reasoned, with 
Rutherford, that mathematical terms could only be adequate to the extensional features of 
motion and not to the causal and actual reality underlying such phenomena. We also 
emphasized that the non-phenomenal nature of force was important to its conception and 
development precisely because it forms the core of his criticism of the purely mechanical and 
geometrical focus of Cartesian mechanics. Yet we also see that part and parcel to this 
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conception of force is quantitative and the reduction of force to metaphysics would result in 
the independence of this quantitative aspect. We noted that the conservation of the quantity 
mv
2
 was developmentally central to the evolution of the notion of force since the mid 1670's. 
Despite the incompleteness of Leibniz's argument for this quantity in the Specimen, we see 
that the idea that there is some quantity conserved in motion is a different from the question 
of what this quantity is.  
 
IV. Stuctura systematis, architectonics and final cause 
 
Our general interpretive problem can now be posed differently. We have suggested 
that Leibniz's notion of force has an irreducible quantitative aspect but just as we are wary of 
reducing force to a metaphysical notion, we are just as wary of reducing it into purely 
extensional qualities. Moving forward, if we succeed in showing a non-phenomenal (non-
empirical) use of quantity in Leibniz's notion of force, we can strike a different kind of 
balance between the metaphysical and scientific desiderata of this notion in the Specimen.  
The key to unlocking this use of quantity is to look at the method behind Leibniz's 
measure of force. Recall that in the second pendulum example, critical of the Cartesians, 
Leibniz treats two pendulums, A with the mass of one unit and C with mass of two units. 
Under the Cartesian hypothesis, these two bodies possess the same amount of “power”, 
conserved as the quantity mv. As it occurs, body C will still attain a height of 4 feet and body 
A will attain 1 foot. In this way, Leibniz argues that the results are paralogistic and would, 
under appropriate arrangements of the pendulums, lead to a perpetual motion machine. 
Instead of directly arguing through the phenomenon of the work and the conservation of 
energy, Leibniz's ad absurdum argument here relies on the more general principle of what he 
calls the equipollence of cause and effect. In the Specimen, Leibniz defines this principle by 
remarking that, “naturam nunqua sibi viribus inaequalia substituere, sed effectum integrum 
semper causae plenae aequalem esse.”34 By effect here Leibniz means the entire phenomenon 
of motion understood as the entire range of the extended or geometrical features (size, shape 
and speed) in a motion. In turn, cause is to be understood as what engenders this range of 
quantities in a motion. In the terms of cause and effect, Leibniz's demonstration of a 
paralogism is in fact the argument that the “cause” proposed by the Cartesians cannot be 
adequate to the entire series of effects rendered quantitatively. 
Our aim here is to stick as close as we can to the Specimen but we cannot ignore the 
immense accumulation of work that led to such a synthetic text. In brief we can underline the 
importance that the principle of the equipollence of entire effect and full cause played in the 
conception and development of the entire dynamics project.
 35
 Already noted by Leibniz in 
the 1676 Elementa philosophiae arcanae, he designates this principle as the primary axiom 
notion governing physics or physical things.
36
 Following commentators like Gueroult and 
Duchesneau, we see how the deployment of the principle allowed Leibniz to move from an a 
posteriori method of analyzing motion in his earlier dynamical writings to an a priori method 
of analysis in the matured view starting around the 1689 Phoranomus seu de potentia et 
legibus naturae and Dynamica de potentia et legibus naturae corporeae.
37
  The problem that 
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Leibniz faced in his earlier dynamical work in the late 1670’s was that although his 
arguments were sufficient to show that the Cartesian laws of nature were erroneous and 
already contained arguments for the superiority of the conservation of mv
2
, not only was this 
insufficient to understand this quantity conserved as the conservation of force but it was also 
far from establishing force as the immanent cause of motion inherent in corporeal substances. 
What marks Leibniz’s maturation was the use of the equipollence of cause and effect to 
develop a formal understanding of cause and effect. Developed in the Dynamica, the a priori 
determination of formal effect is understood as the power to act and the formal cause 
understood as the cause of this power, that is, force. This methodological shift accounts for 
why examples concerning unconstrained motions, say a pendulum, play a central role in his 
estimation of vis viva. These are examples where formal effects are shown through the 
exhaustion of motion attaining rest, what Leibniz calls “violent” effects since in such motions 
power is measured by the “consumption” of power resulting in rest. As we have seen, this 
form of measurement is precisely the sort that Leibniz uses in the Specimen. This shift also 
accounts for why these measurements of forces can only be the result of comparison. A 
collision of bodies preserves the power to act redistributed between the colliding bodies. As 
such force is more directly measured by comparing the exhaustion of different motions or, in 
modern terms, the transfer of kinetic into potential energy. 
We follow Gueroult and Duchesneau in pointing out that the development of a formal 
treatment of the equipollence of cause and effect constitute the aim of such an a priori turn in 
the dynamics.
38
  This move to a formal understanding of cause and effect is what allows 
Leibniz to definitively move away from the insufficiencies of his earlier empirically driven 
reform of what remained essentially a “Cartesian” mechanics. Leibniz could, through this 
turn, impute formal cause and effect to the inherent nature of bodies themselves and hence 
remove himself from a range of possible kinematic (Cartesian, occasionalist or otherwise 
mechanistic) interpretations of his reformed mechanics. In his separate correspondences to 
Papin in 14 April 1698 and to De Volder in 23 March/3 April 1699 (a few years after the 
Specimen), Leibniz could even make a syllogistic argument to define the capacity to act 
through the measurement of the exhaustion of a motion according to a ratio of the square of 
velocity and time.
39
 Such an argument leads to issues beyond our scope here but these 
developments contextualize the Specimen insofar as we can better appreciate how the 
metaphysical understanding of force goes hand in hand with a shift in the manner in which 
Leibniz conceived of the problem of measuring force. In brief, the developmental 
conceptualization of force as the cause of motion coincides with a formalization of the 
quantities in motion, the means through which measurements are put into meaningful 
correspondence. Rather than a separation of the quantitative aspects of motion from their 
metaphysics, the methodological separation of phenomena and metaphysics was precisely 
what Leibniz had to reject and overcome in order to lend credence to the metaphysical reality 
of forces via its determining causal role in ordering the phenomenon of motion.   
We avoid directly imputing such a developmental discussion into the Specimen 
because this text is not one relies on the formalization of cause and effect, something left 
aside for a more condensed explication. However this condensation also reveals how Leibniz 
understood the architectonic principles such as the formal treatment of the equipollence of 
cause and effect, in relation to the dynamics in general. That is, the argument that Leibniz 
pursues in deploying this architectonic principle is a teleological one. Hence in understanding 
what it means for effect to be equipollent to cause in the Specimen, we must emphasize that 
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cause is, at least in his argument here, to be understood teleologically.  
In the Specimen and other texts of the dynamics project, Leibniz emphasizes a double 
sense of causation in understanding motion. The world is governed through two 
interpenetrating but non-conflicting kingdoms, the kingdom of power, that of efficient 
causality and the kingdom of wisdom, that of final causality. Final causality is not however 
solely concerned with the determination of normative values, as one might imagine, 
separating a realm of facts from one of norms. Final causes, as Leibniz argues, have scientific 
importance and do not reduce metaphysically. After all, the idea that from the wisdom and 
providence of God the creator follows the best of all possible worlds is a notion that, for 
Leibniz, plays an ampliative role in many domains. In this vein, Leibniz argues in the 1696 
Tentamen Anagogicum, around the same period as the Specimen, that the inadequacy of 
geometry for demonstrating the laws of motion is due to the fact that it can only rely on 
deductive necessity whereas the demonstrations of actuality require appeal to the degree of 
harmony or perfection in the principles, that is, as Leibniz calls them, « des principes plus 
sublimes, qui marquent la sagesse de l’auteur dans l’ordre et dans la perfection de 
l’ouvrage. » 40 In his separation of the governing principles of the two “kingdoms” in this 
text, this principle of harmony and perfection, or final causality, Leibniz argues, correspond 
to the determination of architectonic principles. 
41
 
Architectonic principles understood as teleological causes are scientifically important 
precisely because geometrical reasoning is too deductively strict to provide a sufficient 
account of phenomena. Hence, on the one hand, laws of motion cannot be deduced 
geometrically and on the other hand, the geometrical features of motion are not sufficient 
reason for their actuality but only their possibility. The specific case Leibniz aimed to address 
in the Tentamen Anagogicum was the controversy over reflection (catoptric) and refraction 
(dioptric) principles in optics. In brief, the Snell-Descartes law, argued by Descartes in his 
1637 Discours de la méthode, had caused a controversy that pitted Fermat against the 
Cartesians. Leibniz was well-read on this topic and also noted Huygens' and Molyneux's 
contributions to the controversy. The controversy was essentially about the principle that 
governed the motion of light in reflection on a surface and refraction through a medium. On 
the question of refraction, the Cartesians, sticking with a mechanistic explanation, argued that 
light would move through the shortest path through the medium and Fermat argued 
teleologically that light would travel with the fastest speed through the medium. The problem 
was that it turned out that both Descartes and Fermat provided calculations that were 
adequate to observation. From the mere description of the geometrical features of the motion 
of light we could not judge between the appropriate principles that governed this very 
motion. 
 Leibniz’s contribution to this debate was that both these opposing positions were in 
some sense right but that neither could grasp the harmony between the efficient and 
teleological causes. Leibniz reasoned that both approaches could be harmonized not only to 
give a single explanation that combined efficient and teleological understanding but also give 
a single principle for reflection and refraction. Leaving out the details here we simply note 
that Leibniz argues that only an architectonic principle, what he calls the principle of the 
“effect of the greatest ease” or “most determined path”, can allow us a maximally explanatory 
but unique principle for determining the actual path of light.
42
  
In the direct context of the Specimen, Leibniz cites, for the sake of authority, that his 
work on the optics published in the Acta Eruditorum of 1682 Unicum Opticae, Catoptricae, 
et Dioptricae Principium had already been commended by Molyneux. The principle of 
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“effect of greatest ease” discussed in the Tentamen Anagogicum refers back to this 1682 
article for which Molyneux gave a partial translation.
43
 Although the problems from the 
domain of optics play a minor role here in the Specimen, the question of this convergence 
between efficient and final causes is significant. As part of the same discussion in the 
Specimen, Leibniz underlines his previous mistakes in understanding efficient cause. Here, 
Leibniz recounts the “materialism” of his youth. Leaving out explicit mention of Hobbes, 
who was no small influence in his youth, he notes the Democritean, Gassendian and 
Cartesian inspiration of his earlier work like the Hypothesis Physica Nova. In recounting his 
youthful follies, he emphasizes the mistake of thinking that, “omne incurrens suum conatuum 
dare excipienti seu directe obstanti qua tali.”44 Here Leibniz makes clear that the development 
of the concept of force allowed him to understand efficient causality without any commitment 
to this model of the transfer of conatus or influxus physicus.
45
 That is to say, the efficient 
causality involved in collision is not the transfer of geometrical quantities from one body to 
another. Rather, motion is the result of the immanent action of force within a substance. The 
most obvious implication here is that a body at rest does not simply “receive” the conatus of 
the body striking it. The quantities of conatus and the effects that result from collision are part 
of a systematic organization of forces that reflect immanent rather than external causes. This 
is what Leibniz means when he argues in the Specimen that the concept of force is meant to 
provide a “structura systematis” that allows us to avoid “quae per se ex nudis motus legibus a 
pura Geometria repetitis consequerentur.”46 As such this systematic structure is one where the 
usual sense of an “efficient cause” is understood as metaphysically and architectonically 
convergent or harmonious with teleological causation.   
What the development of force, through a stuctura systematis, adds to the account of 
motion, regardless of whether we are considering the collision of bodies or the path of light is 
precisely that efficient cause is to be understood as part and parcel with teleological cause. 
Efficient cause cannot be understood by itself since it would have to rely on the inadequate 
resources of geometry. Force qua cause allows us to understand how cause engenders effects 
qua motions in a manner “structura systematis”. Efficient cause is not then a question of 
transferring quantities such as energy from one body to another. Efficient cause allows us to 
calculate motion and predict its behavior through principles and quantities both of which are 
governed and ordered teleologically. As such, force is cause insofar as it is the systematic 
ordering of motion and motion is in turn nothing but the quantitative or geometric values 
expressed in the change of place. The causal nature of force is thus the systematic ordering of 
the quantitative values involved in motion.  
A further point to draw Leibnizian efficient causality away from intuitive notions of 
the “transfer” or “influx” of a quantity in one body to another in collision is that the force or 
“power” qua potentia involved in Leibnizian dynamics is not an Aristotelian “potential” that 
comes to be actualized. For Leibniz, force is in constant action, the immanent reality, qua 
actio, of corporeal substances. In the narration of his youthful errors, Leibniz underlines his 
ignorance of this notion. Indeed, his maturation through the evolution of the concept of force 
results in the constant activity of force even in a body considered to be at rest. The idea is that 
no body is per se at rest and that relative rest can only be hypothesized for the purposes of 
modeling motion. As such the constant action of force in a body, force per se, is present even 
in the body considered at rest qua resistance. In this we see that the causality of force in 
motion can neither be intuitively understood mechanically as the efficient “transfer” between 
potential energy and kinetic energy nor through Aristotle as the actualization of a potential. 
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The conservation of vis viva is thus nothing but the ordering of the quantities in motion.  
We cannot pretend to have given a complete analysis of such a notoriously difficult 
problem as Leibnizian causality here. Regardless of its complexity, we can nonetheless 
establish that, for the purposes of dynamics, final causes play a determining (and 
harmonizing) role in efficient cause.
47
 As such, Leibniz remarks in the Specimen that once the 
architectonic or “general and distant” principles have been established, “quoties postea de 
rerum naturalium causis efficientibus propinquis et specialibus tractatur, animabus aut 
Entelecheiis locum non damus, non magis quam otiosis facultatibus aut inexplicabilibus 
sympathiis.”48 That is, once established, the deeper principles for determining efficient causes 
need not be evoked in using these very causes for purposes of measurement.  
 As such, how does the conservation of force in motion, as mv
2
 or some other quantity, 
measure force itself? In view of the analysis above, we can only say that this “measure” is a 
feature of the comparability of the systematic arrangement of phenomena. The 
epistemological necessity of force as Leibniz emphasizes again and again is due to the 
inadequacy of geometry to furnish a coherent theory of motion. The architectonic principle 
behind this is the equipollence of cause and effect. In strictest sense one cannot say that the 
speed of a pendulum at the base causes it to reach a certain height any more than the speed 
and mass of a certain ball causes the speed of a ball that it collides with. We understand these 
quantities as effects, the entire range of motions and the arrangement of the quantities 
involved therein. As such, the entire range of motions in a pendulum swing is the effect 
caused by force understood architectonically. What it means to measure force then is to 
provide a framework for the comparison of effects through the principle of the equipollence 
of cause and effect.  
The quantities involved in this framework aimed at comparing effects in order to 
compare causes are, as we have argued, relative. Of course, within the account in the 
Specimen, such an organization is given through the conservation of mv
2
. We see that this 
“measure” of force is given architectonically or systematically, that is, by comparison across 
different cases. There is no direct “measure” of force but rather a relative measure through 
comparison. Once such a “measure” is architectonically given, we can directly treat 
individual cases through a notion of efficient cause. Yet even in this move from the 
systematic to the particular cases of efficient cause, the use of quantity remains relative. In 
the pendulum examples, Leibniz “measures” force by taking the effects exhibited in one case 
in comparison with the effects exhibited by another. Sticking with the equipollence of effect 
and cause, the quantitative differences of effects, registered in terms of mass  and velocity, 
imply a difference of force . The role played by the conservation of force mv
2
 is thus that of 
providing a capacity to compare forces through comparing motions or effects. Since force 
qua cause is non-phenomenal only effects can be compared. In understanding the way in 
which this comparison occurs, it is important to bear in mind that the quantity conserved in 
motion is distinct from the idea that some quantity is conserved. The idea that some quantity 
is conserved provides the condition and framework for the comparability of effects. This 
means that an essential feature of force is the organization of the effects that it engenders. As 
such, the comparability of effects, through the quantitative means governed by the 
equipollence of cause and effect, is part and parcel of what it means for force to cause 
motion.   
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This analysis leads us to understand the relationship between force and the quantities 
implied in the phenomenon of motion, qua effects, in a different way. Force is cause in the 
sense that it arranges the phenomenon of motion in a way that God could bring about the best 
of all possible worlds. As such, force is a structurally causal principle that governs the 
organization of phenomena. This organization is none other than the organization of the 
phenomenon of motion which is itself, in turn, none other than geometrical or extensional 
displacement (change of place). The explicit way in which this organization occurs is through 
the conserved quantity mv
2
 but this is only hypothetical in Leibniz’s understanding and a 
revisable feature of the relation of force and motion (cause and effect). Hence if we step back 
from the particular hypothesis of the conservation of mv
2
, we find that what is essential in 
Leibniz’s argumentation is the equipollence of cause and effect. This is the architectonic 
principle responsible for understanding why force is irreducibly quantitative but not 
essentially tied to particular quantities such as the conservation of mv
2
.  
 What is then the irreducible quantitative nature of force? It is clear that the relation of 
force to motion is quantitative only in the comparison between effects. This comparability is 
however not possible without the governing role of force over its motion, as cause and effect. 
This governing role is however the organization of the relation between quantities, not the 
quantities themselves. The quantitative feature of force then is not its association with this or 
that quantity strictly speaking but rather the structural organization of quantities. The 
structuring of relative quantities is what is irreducible in Leibniz’s understanding of force, a 
quantitative feature that is irreducible to metaphysics.  
 
V. Equipollence, equivalence and continuity 
 
 We are now in a position to return to the problem of infinitesimal quantities in the 
Specimen. Infinitesimal quantities like any other quantity in the Specimen are relative to each 
other. We have discussed Leibniz’s framework for comparing non-quantitative forces through 
the quantities available in motion through the equipollence of cause and effect immediately 
above. To push this framework of comparability a step further, we turn to a more 
sophisticated framework of the comparison of quantities given through the architectonic 
principle of the equivalence of hypotheses. Leibniz’s use of the equivalence of hypotheses is 
most known from his correspondence with Clarke, and indirectly Newton, over the relativity 
of motion in the controversy over Newtonian space-time. The term itself is drawn from larger 
contemporaneous discussions, from the geocentric-heliocentric debates, about how the same 
a posteriori predictive models for the movement of the celestial bodies can roughly be 
equivalent despite the contradictory theoretical hypotheses that grounded these models. 
Although questions of just what kind of space-time position Leibniz held and how Leibniz 
understood the relation between his affirmation of the equivalence of hypotheses and 
astronomy are currently debated questions, we shall stick solely to his use of the principle in 
the Specimen.  
In the second and posthumously published part of the Specimen
49
, Leibniz invokes the 
principle of the equivalence of hypotheses in a rather minimal way. He notes, in criticism of 
Descartes’ laws of motion that,  
“aequivalentiam Hypothesium nec per corporum inter se concursus mutari, adeoque tales 
motuum regulas esse assignandas, ut natura motus respective maneat salva nec ex eventu post 
concursum divinari possit per phaenomena, ubi ante concursum fuerit quies aut determinatus 
motus absolutus.”50  
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Echoing earlier geocentric-heliocentric debates, the basic case of the equivalence of 
hypotheses is the case of the relation of a moving body with a stationary one. The principle 
states that the organization of quantities results in the same effect regardless of which body 
we take to be moving and which one stationary. Since Leibniz holds that no body is actually 
stationary, the principle can be generalized to allow that all degrees of motion are relative 
within a motion. As such, the quantities organized through force qua cause not only require 
comparability but that this very comparability is also understood as relative.   
The relativity of the quantities given through the comparison of motion governed by 
the equivalence of hypotheses entail that the quantities in the phenomena of motion, ranging 
from rest to accelerated motion, are relative to each other. This relativity is usually taken by 
commentators to treat problems in Leibniz’s relativity of space-time through the lens of 
Galilean invariance but in the context of the Specimen refer directly to questions of 
continuity. Here however Leibniz uses the equivalence of hypotheses in the Specimen to treat 
the imaginary nature of continuous motion. To clarify this, we start with how the quantities 
involved in motion can be taken as infinitesimal. Leibniz argues that infinitesimal quantities 
are taken to be infinitesimal relative to other quantities taken to be finite. In this, Leibniz 
aimed to make use of Galileo’s position by improving on it. Concerning the problem of 
infinitesimal solicitations or nisus described through the use of dead force that we considered 
at the start of our investigation, Leibniz remarks that, “Et hoc est quod Galilaeus voluit, cum 
aenigmatica loquendi ratione percussionis vim infinitam dixit, scilicet si cum simplice 
gravitatis nisu comparetur.”51 Here Leibniz sees himself as improving on this “enigmatic” 
notion in Galileo by providing a more thorough-going interpretation of the comparison 
between nisus, understood as dead force, and the force of an extended motion, understood as 
living force. It is neither that dead force is infinitesimal and living force finite nor that dead 
force is finite and living force infinite. Seen through the lens of the equivalence of 
hypotheses, insofar as the immobility of dead force is only assumed in the equivalence of 
hypotheses, it is only a comparison of the effects of these causes qua force in extensional 
terms that these quantities (finite and infinite) arise. Of course, it is in the comparability of 
forces, according to the equipollence of cause and effect that requires such a distinction of 
between orders of infinite, finite and infinitesimal quantities. In this Leibniz obeys the 
“compendia ratiocinandi” that he had already formulated, through the development of his 
infinitesimal calculus for the relation between the finite and the infinite, and the finite and the 
infinitesimal.
52
 Here, finite, infinite and infinitesimal are not absolute determinations but 
rather relative to each other. In Breger’s recent explanation of this reasoning per compendia 
ratiocinandi, he explains that, “second-order differentials are infinitely small compared with 
first-order differentials […] If first-order differentials have absorbed a logical quantifier, 
second-order differentials have absorbed two logical quantifiers.”53 For our purposes it is 
through the same kind of relativity of quantitative order that Leibniz takes up the problem of 
accurate measurements [accuratae aestimationes] in motion.  
It seems then that we have a satisfying solution here to how infinitesimals can remain 
fictional but must nonetheless be strictly and irreducibly involved in Leibniz’s dynamics. Any 
quantity, infinite, finite or infinitesimal, is relative to each other and their measurements are 
only relative to the comparison of the effects of the causes of motion. This allows us to 
dissolve any problem regarding his use of infinitesimal quantities in the Specimen. From this 
we are in a position to understand just how such a commitment to the infinitesimal calculus 
becomes essential to his account of motion in the Specimen.  
 Leibniz’s infinitesimal calculus provides the capacity to treat continuity through non-
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continuous terms. A major intuitive starting place for Leibniz’s work on the infinitesimal 
calculus through the quadrature of the circle is the idea of treating a circle, fictionally, as an 
infinitely sided polygon.
54
 This comparability, a notion cautiously borrowed from Galileo’s 
discussion of the “Aristotelian wheel” on the first day of the Discourses and Mathematical 
Demonstrations Concerning the Two New Sciences, was already given its demonstrative 
limits in Leibniz’s 1676 work on the quadrature.55 In the same vein, Leibniz explains to 
Varignon in the same 1702 letter cited above, that this comparability does not mean that a 
circle is a polygon. Nonetheless Leibniz argues,  
« Et quoyque ces terminaisons soyent exclusives, c’est-à-dire non-comprises à la rigueur dans 
les varietés qu’elles bornent, neantmoins elles en ont les proprietiés, comme si elles y estoient 
comprises… qui prend le cercle, par exemple, pour un polygone regulier dont le nombre des 
costés est infini. Autrement la loy de la continuité seroit violée, c’est à dire puisqu’on passe 
des polygones au cercle, par un changement continuel et sans faire de saut, il faut aussi qu’il 
ne se fasse point de saut dans le passage des affections des polygones à celle du cercle. »
56
  
The law or principle of continuity is the larger architectonic principle governing the 
capacity of using discrete terms to treat continuity with falling into the error of taking 
continuity as discrete. In this, the use of discrete terms to treat the continuous always results 
in some degree of error. Yet as Leibniz famously relates to De Volder in a 1706 letter, this 
error nonetheless “semper sit minor quavis assignabili data”.57  
This notion of comparability governed by the principle of continuity is directly salient 
to the problem of cause and effect in our examination of the dynamics. Recall that force is not 
a quantity such that we could locate within a motion. Force is something that is constantly 
active and systematically governs the entire range of quantities involved in a motion. As such, 
we have motion, something continuous and hence imaginary, and on the other hand, 
something that is measured (estimated) to the least error, the measure of force as equivalent 
to the quantity of effects (motion). This equipollence of cause and effect provide a mapping 
of effects to causes in a continuous way. It is obvious that if we hold the equipollence of 
cause and effect, the slightest change in effect implies a proportional change in cause. Since 
changes in motion, measured in terms of extension and time, are measured in continuous 
mathematical terms, they imply that the forces equipollent to these effects are also to be 
continuous. Yet the measurement of forces cannot be reduced to their particular effects and 
the continuity in particular motions does not directly result from the causal nature of forces. 
Hence, the continuity of a motion is not what is invoked here. A differential comparison of 
forces can only occur across different motions and thus the difference between forces at work 
in different motions can only be registered through a comparison of effects across different 
cases. To grasp this systematic organization of the continuous quantities of motion and their 
relation to non-continuous forces, we should momentarily step out of the Specimen to look at 
another important work within the dynamics project. In looking at this example, we not only 
reiterate Leibniz’s commitment to the method of the infinitesimal calculus in the dynamics 
but clarify its necessary role in understanding what constitutes force as cause.   
 
VI. The principle of continuity and the structure of quantities 
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 Up to this point, we have seen why the causal nature of force cannot be divorced from 
its quantitative aspect, its organization of the quantities registered through the comparison of 
the phenomena of motion. We have argued that this comparability of effects and the relative 
nature of quantity within the dynamics can be distinguished from the particular quantities 
used by Leibniz. In this, the particular way in which Leibniz used the infinitesimal calculus to 
describe, for example, dead and living force, thus also seems on par with other hypothetical 
uses of quantities. We have thus argued that the use of infinitesimal quantities in the 
dynamics are relative notions and employed fictionally in such a way that reflects the 
capacity of the infinitesimal calculus to compare discrete and continuous things. What we 
have yet to argue is the necessity of such a quantitative structure, despite the fictionality of 
such quantities themselves, within the dynamics. This necessity is important to clarify 
because the assumption of commentators like Rutherford is that since forces get reduced to 
metaphysics, any mathematics could heuristically play the role of representing motion. As 
such Rutherford, appealing to Levey, argues for the possibility of “modeling the structure of 
matter/force through some form of discrete mathematics.”58  
To show the necessary role played by infinitesimals in the dynamics, we turn to an 
example that Leibniz only eludes to in Specimen but which constitutes a milestone within his 
development of the Dynamics project. This example is from Leibniz’s 1692 Animadversiones 
in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum, a lengthy study and close critical reading 
of Descartes’ Principia philosophiae.59 In his commentary on the 53rd article of the 2nd part of 
the Principia, Leibniz provides a refutation of Descartes’ laws of motion, outlined in 
Descartes’ 52nd article according to a peculiar criterion.60 Leibniz considers, as Descartes 
does, the situation of two bodies of equal mass and equal speeds striking each other as a case 
of rectilinear elastic collision. To demonstrate his difference with Descartes and show the 
latter’s errors, he showed what happens when we reiterate this scenario with different 
velocity values assigned to the second body.
61
  
We can first imagine what will result from the collision of two bodies, b and c, with 
equal mass and opposing velocities (±4 m/s). From Descartes’ first rule, the bodies, b (-4m/s) 
and c (+4m/s), will simply exchange velocities after collision, rebounding each other in a 
perfect elastic collision. But what happens when the speeds are different? Imagine then the 
body b as having the value of (-4m/s) as before and then a second body c as having the values 
of (3m/s). According to Descartes’ analysis of such a scenario according to his third and 
seventh rule, the resulting velocities will be the same for both bodies since the more rapid 
body will carry the other off. The resulting velocities will result from first taking the half of 
the difference of the speeds and then subtracting the speed of the more rapid and adding to 
the speed of the less rapid. In such a case if b is traveling at velocity -4 (more rapid) and c 
traveling at velocity 3 (less rapid), then the half of the difference ((4-3)/2=)0.5 is the quantity 
that will be subtracted from the speed of b resulting in a final velocity of ((-4+0.5)=)-3.5. In 
turn, this same quantity will be added to the speed of body c and it will achieve a final 
velocity of ((-3-0.5)=)-3.5. For clarity’s sake, we take another case where b is traveling at 
velocity -4 and c at -3, moving in the same direction, the more rapid body b will at some 
                                                 
58
 Rutherford, “Leibniz on Infinitesimals and the Reality of Force”, 272; Cf. Samuel Levey, “Leibniz on 
Mathematics and the Actual Infinite Division of Matter”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 107, No. 1 (Jan. 1998), 
49-96. 
59
 GP IV 350-392. 
60
 GP IV 381-384. 
61
 My interpretation here is greatly helped and informed by Larry Jorgensen, “The Principle of Continuity and 
Leibniz’s Theory of Consciousness”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 223-
248, 230-232.  
20 
 
point also impact c and carry c off. The quantity in exchange between this different 
configuration would be ((4-3)/2)=)0.5 and this would result in the first body b having the 
resulting speed at (-4+(0.5)=)-3.5 and the body c moving at (-3-(0.5)=)-3.5. The resulting 
velocity will, like the previous example, be -3.5 for both bodies.  
Leibniz understood as we do, retrospectively, that Descartes’ rules are contrary to 
phenomena. Using the results of Huygen’s theory of elastic collision, Leibniz argues that 
bodies of equal mass will simply exchange their velocities after collision regardless of their 
differences in speed. But here Leibniz deploys a kind of reductio ad absurdum argument.  
Leibniz argues by first demonstrating the Cartesian laws of motion. Assuming both 
elastic collision and that the velocity of body b remains constant at -4, we reiterate the 
collisions by varying the speed of body c. As such, c will take on the values of -4, -3, -1, 0, 1, 
etc. We first note that when both bodies are initially traveling at -4, there is no collision. We 
note that in the case of body b at -4 and body c at 0, Descartes holds that the bodies rebound 
and this collision is not governed by the same law as that of the collision of a faster and 





As shown in the graph above, Leibniz argues that Descartes’ laws of collision leads to 
significant gaps especially around the case of the body c at rest and around the case of the 
equal speed of b and c. Indeed, we know that the major error of Descartes that Leibniz 
wished to point out was the former’s hypothesis that a faster body, regardless of how small 
this additional speed was, could carry the other body off and that the two bodies would then 
travel at half the difference of their quantity. This is the reason for the major gap in the 
correlation of the variation of the initial velocities of c (since the initial velocity of b remains 
constant throughout the cases) with the final velocity of b after collision.  
In Leibniz’s alternative to Descartes, employing Huygens’ laws of elastic collision, 
bodies of equal mass simply exchange velocities after collision. As such, if the initial velocity 
of b is -4 and c is 3, the final velocity after collision would result in b traveling at 3 and c at -
4. The resulting graph, using the same reiteration of cases as above, charts out a continuous 
line. Every variation in the initial velocity of c produces the same value for the final velocity 
of b.  
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The results here are also more apt than Descartes’ in the description of phenomena. Yet this 
empirical inadequacy is not what Leibniz emphasizes here. Leibniz argues instead that the 
graph of Descartes’ laws of collision presents a delineatio monstrosa while the graph of his 
position presents a delineatio concinna.
64
 This argument has the sort of teleological import 
consonant with his argument concerning dioptrics and catoptrics. Leibniz treats the 
“monstrous” character of the plotting of Descartes’ result as a sort of demonstratio ad 
absurdum. In turn Leibniz’s continuous graph is more harmonious than Descartes’ monstrous 
one. We might perhaps call this a demonstratio ad monstrosum.    
 There were a few explicit conclusions that Leibniz wished to draw from this 
demonstration. Two of these points, the inadequacy of Descartes’ collision principles to 
phenomena and that corporeal collision show bodies to be more solid than liquid are 
explicitly emphasized by Leibniz after this criticism of Descartes. But both of these points 
could be argued without this demonstratio ad monstrosum. It was simply sufficient to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of Descartes’ law of motion from its inaccurate empirical 
predictions in order to move toward the different measurements concerning the solidity 
bodies and elasticity of collision. In adding this layer of explanation involving the 
comparison between the Descartes’ laws and his Huygenian alternative, Leibniz wished to 
make a different epistemological point. There is a higher principle that governs the quantities 
manifested at the level of motion. The architectonic principle of continuity is represented in 
his more “continuous” graph than the leaps exhibited in Descartes’ graph. But this is not the 
usual sense of continuity. When the problem of “saltus” in nature is raised in works like 
Pacidius Philalethi, it concerns the question of leaps in a particular extended motion.
65
 Yet 
here we encounter continuity in the sense of a distribution, one that is perhaps more 
consonant with the generation of animal species evoked in the New Essays on Human 
Understanding than, say, the path of a certain extended motion. 
66
 
 Indeed, natura non saltum facit. A full account of the principle of continuity at work 
in this example will take us far afield but we should underline how this example reveals 
Leibniz’s mature thinking about the essential role of continuity in physical phenomena. The 
principle of continuity is argued as an architectonic principle operative in taking a whole 
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series of quantities that reveal the systematically ordering of phenomena. The variation of the 
values of body c in the example is the means by which this continuity can be systematically 
represented. In turn, discontinuity registered on the level of quantities constitutes then, for 
Leibniz, an error. The nature of this error is first argued on the level of principles and then 
only subsequently a misrepresentation of phenomena in the usual sense. As such, the 
principle of continuity is at work in the demonstration of what constitutes a coherent 
phenomenon by taking continuity as the means by which to determine the cause of an entire 
range of the quantities distributed in motion.  
 This use of the principle of continuity is part and parcel of the principle of 
equipollence of cause and effect. Causality is here understood in the same way as we have 
analyzed above. Cause is understood through the organization and comparability of a range 
of quantities in motion and not simply as efficient causality understood as the relation of 
moments within a motion. However continuity allows us to understand how the equipollence 
operates quantitatively. Any variation of the quantity of body c is continuously correlated 
with the variation of the quantity of body b after collision. Continuity hence provides the 
means to render effects, that is, motions, comparable precisely by creating the framework 
where the distributed quantities reflect this equipollence of cause and effect. At the same 
time, this same principle of continuity is also part and parcel with the principle of the 
equivalence of hypotheses in the narrow sense invoked above. It is continuity that allows us 
to relativize the set of quantities involved in motion. All the quantities in the example above 
can be modified without changing the result: the final graph demonstrating the Leibnizian 
result would still be a continuous line albeit with a different slope.    
 This example of how Leibniz employs quantities in his dynamics reaffirms their 
fictional status. Quantitative aspects of motion are only relative to each other and our interest 
in them, for the purposes of the dynamics, is aimed at demonstrating, through their 
comparison, the principles of the ordering of these quantities. Continuity then is a principle 
responsible for the organization of phenomenon. When continuity of the phenomenon is 
demonstrated to be lacking, as in the case of his refutation of Descartes, something of a 
reductio ad monstrosum is revealed. As such, the principle of continuity applies regardless of 
the particular quantities measured or estimated, it provides, like the principle of the 
equipollence of cause and effect and the principle of the equivalence of hypotheses, the 
general architectonic principles of the dynamics. This example demonstrates not only that the 
relation between cause and effect in motion relies on the comparability of the quantities 
registered as effects but that this comparability or this role played by force qua cause in the 
ordering of motion qua effects, is governed by the principle of continuity.  
 The concept of continuity at work here casts a different light on why infinitesimals are 
used in the Specimen. We have already established that the infinitesimal, finite and infinite 
quantities involved in motion are not to be taken per se but are relative to each other. By 
examining the principle of continuity, we demonstrate why the use of these orders of 
quantities is necessary in his dynamics. The ordering and hence comparability of quantities in 
motion imply continuity and with this Leibniz needs to draw from the resources of his 
infinitesimal calculus. This of course does not imply the hypostasization of these fictional 
quantities any more than it implies the hypostasization of any quantity whatsoever. This use 
of quantity, finite, infinite or infinitesimal remains within the realm of the comparison of the 
motive effects of force. Yet what remains is that this feature of continuity is a part of the 
organization of quantities and hence an irreducible causal feature of the relation between 
force and its effects.  
Although it is easy for Leibniz to step back from his use of infinite and infinitesimal 
quantities by the addition of a caveat of their fictionality, the reason why these sorts of 
quantities are part and parcel to the account in the dynamics is not reducible to their 
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fictionality. In order to understand how force causes motion, this compatibility of forces 
through phenomena, or the quantities of motion, relies on the continuity of these quantities. 
That is, the ordering of quantities such that they form a coherent motion requires the principle 
of continuity. Logically then insofar as the causal nature of force is the ordering of 
phenomenon and this ordering requires the principle of continuity, we must conclude that the 
principle of continuity is an irreducible feature of what constitutes force as cause. Hence 
although particular quantities can be abstracted from the account of force, the causal nature of 
force necessitates their quantitative expression through architectonic principles like the 
principle of continuity along with the principle of equipollence of cause and effect and the 
principle of the equivalence of hypotheses. This necessity follows structurally from what it 
means for force to be causal, the structural determination of the relation of quantities even 
when particular quantities are abstracted away.  
 This argument leads us to assert that the necessity of the methods of the infinitesimal 
calculus in the dynamics as a necessary feature of the architectonic principles that governs it. 
What is implied here is nonetheless that the particular uses of infinitesimal, finite and infinite 
terms in measurement refer to fictional entities. Yet, just as particular quantities such as mv
2
 
can be set aside or rejected without rejecting the idea that some quantity is conserved in 
motion to preserve the comparability between the relative quantities in motion, we can 
maintain that specific infinitesimal quantities can be set aside or rejected without rejecting the 
infinitesimal structure necessary for understanding how forces cause motion. This is a 
consequence of understanding that the way in which forces cause motions is indirect in the 
sense that forces are not themselves quantitative.  
Forces cause motion through a number of principles which allow them to be 
comparable through their quantitative effects in motion. There is thus something irreducibly 
quantitative about forces. Insofar as the causal nature of force is to be found in the ordering of 
the phenomena of motion, this very ordering is essentially structured through the 
mathematics of continuity opened up by the infinitesimal calculus that Leibniz had developed 




What our argument above does not contest is the rejection that forces can be directly 
correlated with quantities of either the infinitesimal, finite or infinite sort. In this, not only do 
we reaffirm this partial agreement with commentators like Rutherford, but give additional 
reasons for this fundamental agreement. Yet our argument here also shows that this rejection 
of real infinitesimal quantities must also entail the rejection of a mere reduction of forces to a 
metaphysical level. Although Leibniz used forces to articulate his ideas about hylomorphic 
substance in an explicit and central way throughout the 1690’s, the very notion was 
developed to provide a causal explanation for the realm of physical phenomenon. This very 
causal nature of force is one that provides consistency and order to physical phenomena. 
Although counter-intuitive in certain respects, the causal nature of force engenders its effects 
systematically through the harmony, or convergence, of teleological and efficient causation. 
As we have shown, the way in which non-geometric or non-extended forces could cause 
geometric and extended motions can only be understood in this way. That is, dynamical 
causation is structural. Forces cause motions structurally and indirectly by the organization of 
their extended, geometrical and quantitative features.  
As such the crucial disagreement with commentators like Rutherford is in our 
divergent understanding of the relation between quantity and force. Rutherford argues, as I 
have noted above, that if forces cannot be represented by a quantity then these forces must be 
reduced radically to the metaphysical level. This is due to the understanding that since forces 
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are real and motions (qua geometrical) imaginary, a separation must be made in order that, 
unlike the Cartesian position, forces are not allowed to slip into the geometrical realm. Of 
course Rutherford’s position also entails that since forces are not essentially tied to the 
quantities of motion, understood as mere imagination, alternative ways of representing these 
quantities such as with the exclusive use of discrete entities can also be plausible. We have 
argued that there is another way to understand the role of quantity in Leibniz’s treatment of 
forces. Although Leibniz appears to correlate infinitesimal quantities with moments of (dead) 
force in the Specimen, if we understand that these measurements, as Leibniz calls them, are 
only the results of an interpretation of quantities made structurally or systematically, we find 
that quantities play an actual and not merely imaginary role in articulating the causal nature 
of force. As such forces are not themselves quantitative but play the crucial role of providing 
the structure of these very quantitative features. When all imagination qua quantities are 
abstracted away, we see that systematic or architectonic features of the relation of force qua 
cause and motion qua effect entail explicit architectonic principles, like the principle of 
continuity, through which this causation occurs. In short, Leibniz presents another way of 
understanding the role of quantity. With the emergence of the concept of force, something 
that kept Leibniz busy for two long decades, the conceptualization of the geometrical features 
of motion supersede the merely imaginary mechanistic picture. What arises is the use of 
quantities in expressing just how causality is to be identified and harmonically synthesized 
through architectonic principles. 
The post-Galilean project of mathematizing nature would have been futile if the aim 
was merely to make a mere correspondence between mathematics and nature. In this, Leibniz 
was not the only one in his time to understand that any account of physical motion cannot 
succeed without being mediated by theory-laden interpretations of how the extensional 
features are to be made comparable. Leibniz’s own solution, one that still conservatively 
wished to place quasi-Aristotelian causality as the terms through which such an interpretation 
can be given, nonetheless required a deep commitment to the structure afforded by the 
mathematical innovations of his infinitesimal calculus. This means, above all, that insofar as 
there is no direct correspondence between quantities and their underlying real causes, 
empirical measurements in terms of size, shape and magnitude are relevant in the account of 
phenomena only through a higher level of theoretization that renders these quantities 
systematically coherent. As such, when Leibniz measures dead force with an infinitesimal 
quantity, we should not take this as a correspondence between real forces and imaginary 
quantities. In this regard even the idea of force as being representable by quantity, 
infinitesimal or finite, is misleading. Yet forces are however irreducibly quantitative and this 
quantitative aspect requires a deep commitment to the notion of continuity made available 
through the infinitesimal calculus. In short, at least for Leibniz, force without its quantitative 
aspect is empty and quantity without its causal organization is blind. Fictions are thus not 
blind in the Specimen but work precisely because they are guided by the concept of force.  
 
